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finds substantial underground economy in the non-OECD countries for the period 1984-2005 
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Underground economy estimates for non-OECD countries using currency demand 
method, 1984-2005 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 There has recently been renewed interest in the measurement and analysis of the 
underground economy using the currency demand method. Most of these studies, 
however, have focused on the economies of the OECD countries. Beginning with the 
seminal work of Tanzi (1980) for the U.S. economy, these studies include Matthews 
(1982) for the U.K., Klovland (1984) for Norway and Sweden, Bajada (1999) for 
Australia, Giles (1999) for New Zealand, Schneider (2002) for 21 OECD countries, and 
Giles and Tedds (2002) for Canada.  These studies, which all point to significant amount 
of tax evasion in these countries, have broadened our understanding on the causes and 
extent of tax evasion in developed countries. 
The underground economy in developing countries is apparently higher due to the 
inefficiency in the tax system. Using data from tax returns, Alm, Bahl and Murray 
(1991), for instance, calculate the rate of tax evasion for Jamaica at about 40 percent for 
the year 1983.1  Because of such considerable tax evasion, tax revenue mobilization is 
difficult in many of the countries.  As a result, the governments of these countries often 
resort to financial repression to meet their spending needs; this has led, however, to 
various distortions such as reduced investment and economic growth (Alm and Buckley 
(1998); Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Thus, studying the underground economy of 
such countries is of paramount importance. 
The use of the currency approach to estimate the underground economy in 
developing countries has been ignored until recently.  To our knowledge, Bagachwa and 
Naho (1995) for Tanzania, Faal (2003) for Guyana and Koyame (1996) for eight Sub-
Saharan African countries are the only studies that estimate underground economy for 
non-OECD countries using currency demand method. The omission is mainly due to 
unavailability of adequate data; data constraints are now, however, being relaxed. 
In this paper, we estimate the size of the underground economy induced by tax 
evasion for a panel of non-OECD countries. We make several contributions to the 
literature of tax evasion and the demand for currency. First, by using panel data 
estimation methods we are now able to include in our analysis many developing countries 
for which usually data spanning long period of time (that enable a robust application of 
time series methods) are not available.  Panel data overcomes such hurdle by providing 
more degrees of freedom in the estimation of the currency equation. 
Second, the use of panel data helps to condition the currency ratio on variables 
that are not available in time series modeling because such variables do not have much 
intra-country variation overtime (e.g., institutional quality indicators). Time series 
estimation methods cannot adequately pick the effect of such variables on currency 
demand; the panel data method, however, can do so by accounting for the cross-sectional 
variation of the variables. 
                                                 
1 Given that their study deals only with filed taxes, the rate of tax evasion is likely to be higher for that year 
than the amount reported by the authors. It has to be pointed out that such studies, though useful, are few. 
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Other contribution of this study builds on the flaw of recent studies of tax evasion 
and currency demand: they are misspecified due to omitted variable problem. Previous 
studies don’t include the enforcement strength of the tax authorities in the estimation of 
the currency equation because they include only the tax rate as the tax evasion factor. It is 
well documented in the literature of tax evasion that enforcement strength of the tax 
authorities is a crucial tax evasion factor with the relationship that higher enforcement 
reduces tax evasion (see e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). Thus, any analysis of tax 
evasion without enforcement parameter is incomplete leading to the misspecification 
bias.  To remedy this problem, we use institutional quality indicators as a proxy for the 
enforcement strength of the tax authorities. 
The main contribution of the study lies in its ability to estimate the underground 
economy for various non-OECD countries in different periods. The absence of adequate 
cross-sectional estimates of the underground economy has limited the study of the causes 
and consequences of underground economy. Our study contributes towards relaxing such 
constraint. With our estimates of underground economy for a panel of countries, it is now 
possible, for instance, to reexamine previous studies of the relationship between 
underground economy and other macroeconomic aggregates using panel data instead of 
simple cross-section relationship. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
determinants of the currency ratio which will serve to determine which variables must be 
included in the estimation of currency equation. Section 3 discusses the estimation 
methodology and the data used in the study. Section 4 presents the estimation results for 
the currency equation and the estimates of underground economy for the countries in our 
sample.  Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Determinants of the Currency Ratio and a Brief Description of the Currency 
    Demand Method 
 
We use  Tanzi (1980) currency demand method to estimate the underground 
economy. The method consists in estimating an equation with currency to M2 ratio as the 
dependent variable and several explanatory variables measuring tax evasion and non-tax 
evasion activities. The key assumption in the currency demand approach is that 
underground economic activities are the direct cause of high taxes and that currency 
instead of demand deposits is used for undertaking such transaction because currency 
leaves no trace. 
Following Cagan (1958) and subsequent studies, we include the tax rate (T), real 
per capita income (Y), and interest rate on time deposits as explanatory variables. To 
these we augment the degree of urbanization (U), the enforcement strength of the tax 
administration (E), and the inflation rate (π ), as discussed in more detail later. The 
equation, therefore, can be given by: 
 
)U,,E,R,Y,T(f2M/Cln π=                                                                       (1)  
 
The expected sign on Y, E and R are negative, while on T is positive. The expected signs 
on U and π  are ambiguous. 
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Cagan (1958) argues that as income increases the currency ratio falls because 
demand deposits are superior assets than currency. In cross-country context, economic 
development or financial sophistication, as proxied by per capita income, leads to 
reduced use of currency and increased use of checks, implying a negative relationship 
between per capita income and currency to M2 ratio. The interest rate is the opportunity 
cost of holding currency rather than interest bearing assets such as time and saving 
deposits. The effect of the interest rate on the currency ratio is, therefore, negative. 
Although he doesn’t empirically test for it, Cagan (1958) argues that the degree of 
also urbanization as a potential determinants of the currency ratio.  On the one hand, 
urbanization causes people to trade where they are not known, which reduces the use of 
checks and increase the use of currency.  On the other hand, the use of checks is lower in 
rural areas than in cities where the people are more sophisticated. Because of these two 
conflicting effects, the net effect of the degree of urbanization on the currency ratio is 
ambiguous. 
Next we discuss briefly the effects of the tax rate, the enforcement strength of the 
tax authorities, and the inflation rate. These variables constitute the tax evasion factors. 
Since currency provides anonymity, individuals who decide to evade tax use more 
currency and less demand deposits. In particular, the higher the tax rate, the higher the 
currency ratio. Another crucial tax evasion factor that was overlooked in previous studies 
of currency demand is the enforcement strength of the tax administration. There is an 
unambiguous positive relationship between higher tax enforcement capability of the tax 
administration and the level of the tax evasion (see e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). 
Previous studies don’t include any measure or proxy of tax enforcement strength when 
estimating the currency equation. This omission is likely to lead to the misspecification 
bias in the estimated relationship. Inflation is also another factor that possibly affects tax 
evasion that previous studies have omitted in the currency demand analysis. When tax 
systems are not indexed, higher inflation creates tax bracket creep and increases the tax 
liabilities of taxpayers which results in higher tax evasion.  Fishburn (1981) argues that 
one way inflation can affect the decision to evade taxes is based on the fact that inflation 
erodes the real value of a given level of nominal disposable income which gives taxpayer 
the incentive to evade more taxes to restore their purchasing power.  Crane and Nourzad 
(1986) test the effect of inflation on United States aggregate tax evasion for the period 
1947-81and they find that tax evasion is positively related to the inflation rate. Inflation, 
however, can also affect the currency ratio negatively when individuals lessen the erosion 
of the purchasing power of their currency by substituting it for interest bearing assets 
such as time deposits. 
Once equation (1) is estimated, it can be used to calculate the yearly underground 
economy as follows.  First the predicted value of the currency with all factors included 
(C*) is computed. From this then is subtracted the predicted value of currency when the 
tax rate and enforcement strength are assigned zero and 1, respectively (C**).2 The result 
                                                 
2 Some time series studies use the minimum tax rate that the country experienced instead of the zero tax 
rate to find the level of currency demand associated with no-tax evasion situation (the same applies to the 
other tax evasion factors); however, this is not the appropriate approach especially for the study which 
includes varied cross-section of countries having widely varying minimum tax rates. This is because a 
country that has high tax rate for the current year will have its underground economy calculated very low if 
its minimum tax is also high or close to the given year’s tax rate. Similarly, a country with moderate tax 
rate in a given year will have its underground economy calculated very high if its minimum tax is very low. 
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is the stock of currency attributed to tax evasion which when multiplied by velocity of 
money yields the amount of income or transactions supported by this stock of illegal 
currency.3 Finally dividing this quantity by the GDP, we find the underground economy 
as percentage of the official economy. 
 
 
3. Estimation Methodology and the Data 
 
Estimation Methodology 
 
We estimate the currency equation using recently developed GMM dynamic panel 
data method.4 To explain the tenets of the method, define itz  as the logarithm of currency 
to M2 ratio in country i at time t. The relationship can then be represented in a dynamic 
form as in the following equation: 
                                    itiititiit uXzz +++= − ηβα 1,   (1) 
where, 1t,iz −  is the lagged value of the currency ratio through which dynamics is 
introduced to the relationship, and itX is a vector of explanatory variables that include tax 
evasion and nontax evasion factors that potentially determine the currency ratio. iη  is the 
country specific effect and itε is the error term which is assumed to be white noise. 
 First differencing the dynamic equation gets rid of the unobserved individual 
specific effect and generates the following equation: 
)uu()'XX()zz(zz 1t,iit1t,iit2t,i1t,i1t,iit −−−−− −+β−+−α=− .             (2) 
By construction, the differenced lag of the currency ratio )zz( 2t,i1t,i −− −  in (2) is correlated 
with the error term, )uu( 1t,iit −− . It is also possible that x  also contains potentially 
endogenous variables such as the tax rate which is jointly determined with tax evasion. 
Therefore, we need to introduce instruments to fix the effect of the endogeneity problem 
to get consistent estimates.  The dynamic panel data approach instruments the differenced 
right-hand-side variables with their appropriately lagged levels.  Under the assumption of 
serially uncorrelated errors ( 01, =−tiituEu ), the following moment conditions furnish the 
appropriate instruments for the differenced lagged dependent variable and the other 
endogenous regressors: ( ) 0uzE itsit =Δ−  for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2                                            (3) ( ) 0uE itsit =Δ−X  for t = 3, …, T and s ≥ 2.                                          (4) 
When these two moment conditions hold, we can use the lagged levels of the 
variables as instruments for the first differenced variables.  However, when the lagged 
                                                                                                                                                 
Such approach has no support in the theoretical literature that promulgates that tax evasion is a function of 
the economic return from tax evasion which is the current tax burden. 
3 Here it must be assumed that the velocities of money in the underground and official economy are the 
same and is given by GDP divided by the stock of legal currency. 
4 see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) for full 
description of the model. To see how this model compares with other panel data methods, we also present 
results from traditional panel data methods namely the pooled OLS, the fixed effect, and the random effect 
methods. The properties of these estimators are well known and, therefore, are not discussed here. 
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levels i.e., the instruments are weakly correlated with subsequent first differences, 
correction for small sample must be made.  Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an 
estimator that makes use of additional information in levels.  This estimator, referred to 
as the system GMM estimator, combines the equation in first difference and the equation 
in the levels.  This introduces an additional T-2 moment conditions given by: ( )[ ] 0zuE 1ititi =Δ+η −                                                                           (5) ( )[ ] 0XuE 1ititi =Δ+η − .                                                                        (6) 
In Summary, the GMM system estimator uses the moment conditions (3)-(6) to 
obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of the currency equation. We use Sargan 
(1958) test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of the instruments.  The null 
for this test is that the instruments are valid (i.e., orthogonal to the error term).  Under the 
null, the test statistic is distributed ( )2 kL−χ , where L  is the number of instruments and k  is 
the number of parameters in the model. 
Recall that the GMM estimator yields consistent estimates only if the errors in the 
level equation are white noise; hence, it is important that this condition be satisfied for 
the estimation to be valid. To test whether the errors in the level equation are white noise, 
we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the second-order autocorrelation in the 
difference equation.  The null of this test is that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the difference equation. 
 
Data 
 
The data sources for each of the variables are as follows.  The Data for the 
currency, M2, and interest rate are drawn from International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (2008).  Currency is defined as the notes and 
coins held outside banks, and M2 consists of money plus quasi money.  The interest rate 
measure used is the bank deposit rate.  The data for the tax rate, the rate of inflation, 
degree of urbanization, and per capita income are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2007).  The tax rate measure used is the total tax burden given by 
the total tax revenue as percentage of GDP.5 The degree of urbanization is measured by 
the percentage of population living in urban areas.  The measure of the average income of 
the taxpayer is the per capita income in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  Inflation is defined as 
the percentage change in consumer price index. 
The variable enforcement strength of the tax administration is proxied by a 
measure of institutional quality indicators.6  The proxy is constructed as the product of 
                                                 
5 We also use direct and indirect tax rates to see the separate effect of these rates on tax evasion. The results 
using these rates perform poorly and are not reported here. The result is most probably due to the problems 
of multicollinearity when direct and indirect tax rates are included in the same regression. The number of 
observations are also lower when both of these tax rates are used which makes the multicollinearity 
problem more severe. 
6 Ideally, the enforcement strength is measured by the likelihood of detection of tax evaders and the 
severity of penalty imposed on them. The probability of detection of violators would be measured by the 
number of people audited per total number of taxpayers. The penalty rate would be measured by the 
statutory rate at which the government penalizes the violators.  Such data are not readily available for most 
countries.  Even if they were, they are unlikely to be good proxy for the tax enforcement strength because 
when one thinks about tax law enforcement, the letter of the law is one thing and the zeal or efficiency with 
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two institutional quality indicators, the scores of quality of bureaucracy and the rule of 
law.7 When taxpayers contemplate underreporting income, they consider the efficiency or 
strength of the bureaucracy in fighting tax evasion.  In a corrupt tax administration, it 
would be easy to get away with dodging tax (if caught) by bribing the tax collector. 
Therefore, institutional quality indicators can adequately proxy for the level of efficiency 
of the tax administration.8 The quality of bureaucracy and rule of law scores are drawn 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk Services (2006) 
in which data points are available since 1984. The sample includes non-OECD countries 
and the study period is 1984-2005. The countries included in the sample are reported in 
Table 1. See the Appendix for all tables. 
 
4. Estimation Result of the Currency Equation and Underground Economy 
 
Estimation of the Currency Equation 
Table 2 reports both the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the 
variables used in the estimation. The upper part of the table reports the descriptive 
statistics for the main variables. The descriptive statistics demonstrates that there is a 
wide cross-country variation in the currency ratio for non-OECD countries ranging from 
1 to 86 percent. The lower part of the table reports the correlation matrix for the 
variables.  The correlation results show that there is not much multicollinearity between 
the explanatory variables. With regard to each explanatory variable’s relationship to the 
currency ratio, the results show that each variable, except the tax rate, is related to the 
currency ratio as expected. The tax rate is inversely related to the currency ratio which is 
contrary to the expectation that higher tax rate results in higher tax evasion and hence 
higher currency holdings relative to broad money. 
A simple correlation coefficient between two variables indicates a linear 
relationship between the variables without controlling for the effect of other potential 
explanatory variables.  To gauge the separate effect of each explanatory variable after 
controlling for the effects of other variables, we further investigate the relationship using 
regression analysis. 
 In using the regression approrach, we find evidence that the there is persistence in 
the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are endogenous. When such 
econometric problems are present, the traditional panel data estimators (Pooled OLS, 
                                                                                                                                                 
which such law is implemented is another. In countries where the tax administration is inefficient, higher 
rate of audit doesn’t translate into higher detection and punishment as people caught might easily get away 
with it because of corruption in the tax administration. Similarly, higher statutory penalty rate decreed by 
law doesn’t imply higher actual penalty due to weak enforcement capabilities. 
7 The data on “rule of law” ranges from 0 to 6, low to high rule of law; the original data for quality of 
bureaucracy ranges from 0 to 4, low to high quality of bureaucracy, respectively. We convert quality of 
bureaucracy to 0 to 6 ranges by multiplying the original data by 1.5 to conform to the 0-6 scale of the rule 
of law score. Then, Enforcement = (quality of bureaucracy * rule of law/36). This maps the enforcement 
strength variable to 0-1 scale. 
8 There are, however, some limitations on the institutional quality indicators data available- they are 
institutional quality measures at large and not specific to tax administration. However, if we think 
institutional quality as a reflection of the government’s inefficiency, then inefficiency in one function of the 
government is reflected in other functions.  Likewise, an improvement of efficiency in one of the functions 
of government generally spills over to the other functions. Thus, our use of these aggregate institutional 
indicators as a measure of enforcement strength in tax administration does not bias our results. 
 8
Fixed Effect and Random Effects models) don’t yield consistent estimates. The GMM 
dynamic panel data method, however, can simultaneously deal with the problem of 
persistence and endogeneity. We, therefore, restrict our estimation to this estimator as 
discussed below.9  
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the currency demand equation using the 
GMM dynamic panel data model. Different specifications are reported in the table. The 
first specification, for instance, shows estimation results when enforcement strength is 
not included, reminiscent of previous studies. 
Before we discuss the individual coefficient estimates of this specification, it is 
vital to check whether the conditions for using the dynamic panel data model are met.  
The use of GMM dynamic panel data model requires that the error term of the equation in 
levels be white noise. This is tested by checking the absence of second order 
autocorrelation in the differenced equation.  Therefore, the first specification test pertains 
to testing the presence or absence of second order autocorrelation. Specifically, we test 
the null that there is no second order autocorrelation in the differenced equation. The 
result of our test reports an autocorrelation test statistic with p-value greater than .05 
implying that the null is not rejected at 5 percent. We, therefore, conclude that there is no 
evidence for second order autocorrelation. 
The other test is the validity of the instruments used. The endogenous variables 
considered are the lagged value of the dependent variable and the tax rate. We use the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of the instruments.  The 
table reports the p-value of the Sargan test of joint validity of instruments. The p-value 
shows that the null cannot be rejected at 5 percent significance level which leads us to 
conclude that the use of the lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments is 
valid. 
Turning to the individual estimates, the lagged value of the currency ratio is 
highly significant in each specification which implies that the dependent variable is 
persistent. In the first specification where we don’t control for enforcement strength, the 
tax rate is not significant. Once we control for enforcement parameters, however, it 
becomes significant and is positive. It can be argued that the effect of the tax rate on the 
currency ratio can be properly gauged only after we control for the enforcement strength. 
The higher tax burden, the higher the tax evasion and higher currency holdings relative to 
M2, other things being equal. The estimate on enforcement strength variable is negative 
and significant as expected. Given these results on the tax rate and the enforcement 
variable, it can be said that countries with high tax rates and weak enforcement 
capabilities experience rampant tax evasion; if high tax rate rates can be backed by strong 
enforcement capabilities, however, tax evasion would be small. 
In the third equation, we report the results of robustness checks on the coefficient 
estimates of the variables of interest i.e., the tax rate and enforcement strength variables. 
The robustness check is undertaken by including the percentage of underage population 
as additional conditioning variable. Ladenson and Makinen (1992) argues that because 
the underage are not allowed to own demand deposits by law in most countries but do 
substantial transactions in cash, currency holding will be higher the higher the relative 
size of the underage population, ceteris paribus.  The results of including this covariate in 
                                                 
9 As expected, estimations results from the traditional panel data methods perform poorly and are not 
reported here to save space. They are available from the authors upon request 
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our estimation demonstrate that it is not significant. More importantly, it doesn’t reduce 
the robustness of the significance of the tax rate and enforcement variables. Given these 
results, our preferred specification is one represented by the second equation because of 
its parsimony. The discussion of the coefficient estimates for the other variables of the 
model are based on this preferred equation. 
The coefficient on income per capita is also negative and significant as expected.  
A negative estimate for per capita income implies that as a country develops the use of 
currency relative to M2 declines due to increased financial sophistication. The coefficient 
estimate on interest rate is significant and negative. The result vindicates that as the 
opportunity cost of holding currency rises, the cost of holding currency increases 
reducing the currency to M2 ratio. Higher inflation rate increases an individual’s nominal 
income, and since most tax systems are not indexed, higher inflation leads to tax bracket 
creep; and as the taxpayers move to higher tax brackets their tax liabilities increases 
which leads them to evade more resulting in higher currency ratio.  The result shows that 
the estimate of the inflation rate is positive but it is not significant. Finally, the coefficient 
estimate on urbanization is positive but not significant. 
 
Estimation of Underground Economy 
 
 Having estimated the currency equation, it is possible now to calculate the yearly 
estimate of the underground economy induced by tax evasion for the countries in the 
sample. Our preferred specification is the one given by second equation in Table 3 since 
the coefficient estimates on the tax evasion factors have the expected sign and is more 
parsimonious than the third equation. 
 Using the above procedure we calculated the yearly underground economy as 
percentage of GDP for all the countries in the sample for the period 1984-2005.10 Here, 
however, we report only the summary statistics of underground economy for entire 
period of study and for the sub periods given in 5 year interval. These summaries are 
reported in Table 4.  In the first row is given the summary statistics of the underground 
economy for the entire period of study, 1984-2005. The results show substantial 
underground economy and a wide variation of its magnitude across countries during the 
period under investigation.  The mean underground economy for the group is about 18 
percent of GDP and the standard deviation is 12 percent.  The lowest figure of 
underground economy as a percent of the official economy in the sample is of Kuwait at 
about 2 percent of GDP, and the highest one is of Ethiopia at about 70 percent of GDP. 
Comparing the sub-periods, it can be said that the underground economy declined over 
time for the countries as a whole. This is to be expects as countries increase their tax 
effort they are able to increase their tax revenue by increasing the efficiency in their tax 
administration. 
Table 5 reports the list of countries and the corresponding mean underground 
economy for recent period, 2000-2005. The highest underground economy as percentage 
of GDP for the period is of Democratic Republic of Congo at 61 percent replacing 
Ethiopia in recent period. The lowest underground economy for the recent period is again 
of Kuwait at about 2.4 percent of GDP. 
                                                 
10 The yearly estimates are available from the authors up on request. 
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We also compare our estimates to an important study done by Schneider (2004). 
He estimates underground economies for 145 countries for the year 1999-2003 using the 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method.  The bottom part of Table 4 
reports the summary statistics of his estimates. We also report our estimates for the same 
period along his estimates for the countries included in both studies. The mean of 
underground economy of his estimates is about 39 percent of GDP compared to ours of 
about 17 percent (when our sample is restricted to those that are included in his sample). 
The standard deviation of Schneider’s estimates is about 13 percent compared to ours at 
about 15 percent. 
The comparison of the estimates is also presented in Figures 1.  The figure shows 
a scatter plot and an upward slopping linear fit of the underground economy estimates of 
Schneider (2004) and the author. The fitted line demonstrates a positive correlation 
between the two estimates, although the R2 of the fitted line is only 0.12. The low R2 and 
a glance at the scatter plot shows that the estimates of the two studies diverge for many 
countries. Figure 2 reports a plot of the two set of estimates after removing some outliers. 
The R2 after removing outliers is 0.13, which demonstrates that the low correlation 
between the two estimates of underground economy is not derived by outliers. 
The divergence in the estimates emanates partly from the difference in the method 
of estimating of the underground economy.  Schneider (2004) uses the MIMIC method to 
estimate the underground economy. The main tenet of the MIMIC method is that the 
indices of underground economy rather than the actual underground economy is 
calculated using its various causes; the indices are then multiplied by a scaling factor to 
convert the indices into actual underground economy figures.  The scaling factor is 
usually derived from other studies or methods of estimation. Thus, the actual size of 
underground economy in the MIMIC method is dependent on the choice of this external 
information. The arbitrary nature of the scaling factor in the MIMIC method is not the 
only reason for the divergence of the two estimates, though. The most important reason 
for the divergence has to do with the fact that each study apart from the tax rate uses 
different additional causes of underground economy. While Schneider (2004) uses a 
measure of the degree of government regulation as another cause of underground 
economy in addition to the tax rate, we use a measure of enforcement strength of tax 
administration as another cause of tax evasion to come up with underground economy 
estimate that is consistent with the theory of tax evasion. Since Schneider’s does not 
control for enforcement strength, his estimates are such that countries with higher tax 
rates will have bigger underground economy. In countries with higher enforcement 
capabilities, however, higher tax rate do not in fact result in higher tax evasion. As most 
tax rates are calculated as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, higher tax rates might be the 
result of higher tax effort of the tax administration. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The study estimates the underground economy for non-OECD countries using the 
currency demand method. In estimating the currency demand equation, unlike past 
studies, we augment a measure of tax enforcement strength of the tax authorities in 
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addition to the tax rate as the tax evasion factor to have an estimation that is consistent 
with the theory of tax evasion. 
Using the GMM dynamic panel data model for the period 1984-2005, we find that 
the currency to M2 ratio tends to be higher the higher the economic return from 
underreporting, as given by the tax rate, and the weaker the enforcement strength of the 
tax authorities, after controlling for other determinants of currency demand.  The control 
variables are per capita income, the interest rate, inflation, and the degree of urbanization.  
From the estimated currency demand equation, then, we estimate the underground 
economy of the countries in the sample.  Our calculations show that in many of these 
countries the size of the underground economy as percent of GDP is substantial and it 
shows wide variation across the countries. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Countries 
Algeria   Liberia   
Argentina   Madagascar   
Bahamas, The  Malawi   
Bahrain   Malaysia   
Bangladesh   Mali   
Bolivia   Malta   
Botswana   Mexico   
Brazil   Mongolia   
Burkina Faso  Morocco   
Cameroon   Namibia   
Chile   Nicaragua   
Colombia   Nigeria   
Congo, Dem. Rep. Oman   
Congo, Rep.  Papua New Guinea 
Costa Rica  Paraguay   
Cote d'Ivoire  Peru   
Cyprus   Philippines   
Dominican Republic  Senegal   
Ecuador   Sierra Leone  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Singapore   
El Salvador  South Africa  
Ethiopia   Sri Lanka  
Gabon   Syrian Arab Rep. 
Gambia, The  Thailand   
Ghana   Togo  
Guatemala   Trinidad and Tobago 
Guinea-Bissau   Tunisia   
Indonesia   Turkey   
Iran, Islamic Rep. Uganda   
Israel   Uruguay   
Jamaica   Venezuela, RB  
Jordan   Yemen, Rep.  
Kenya   Zambia   
Kuwait   Zimbabwe   
Lebanon   
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
   
 
C/M2 
 
tax 
rate 
 
 
enforce 
per 
capita 
income 
 
interest 
rate 
 
 
inflation
 
 
urban 
Observations 2587 1530 1846 2538 2690 2419 2690 
Mean 0.22 0.17 0.16 2860 0.27 13.47 0.48 
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.08 0.17 4051 2.58 25.77 0.24 
Minimum 0.01 0.018 0 57 0 -100.00 0.05 
Maximum 0.86 0.57 1 29945 93.94 268.15 1.00 
               
   
 
log(C/M2)
 
tax 
rate 
 
 
enforce 
per 
capita 
income 
 
interest- 
rate 
 
 
inflation
 
 
urban 
log(C/M2) 1       
tax rate -0.162 1      
enforce -0.395 0.239 1     
per capita income -0.410 0.021 0.655 1    
interest rate  -0.046 0.117 -0.104 -0.042 1   
inflation 0.011 0.069 -0.158 -0.100 0.847 1  
urban -0.251 -0.009 0.376 0.714 0.120 -0.003 1 
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Table 3. GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Results- Dependent Variable- log(C/M2) 
 
Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
    
log(C/M2)-1 0.862*** 0.826*** 0.818*** 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.039) 
tax rate 0.233 0.447* 0.329* 
 (0.177) (0.263) (0.198) 
inefficiency    0.623*** 0.502*** 
  (0.237) (0.173) 
log(income) -0.104*** -0.092* -0.076 
 (0.023) (0.047) (0.048) 
interest rate -0.164*** -0.135* -0.185** 
 (0.046) (0.078) (0.085) 
inflation rate 0.001*** 0.001 .0012* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (.0007) 
urban 0.480*** 0.295 0.472 
 (0.115) (0.243) (0.460) 
dependent population   0.138 
   (0.249) 
Constant 0.209* 0.071 -0.233 
 (0.114) (0.275) (0.466) 
Serial correlation test   
      statistics (p-value) 
   
Sargan test statistics (p-value)    
Observations 1073 1042 1042 
Countries 84 84 84 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Estimate of the Underground Economy (% of GDP) 
 
Period Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
            Current Estimates 
1984-2005 1277 17.5 12.0 2.1 70.0
1984-1988 272 24.1 15.8 4.7 66.2
1989-1993 285 19.3 13.6 2.7 70.0
1994-1998 259 15.0 9.0 2.1 62.6
1999-2003 415 15.1 8.6 2.1 62.6
2004-2005 97 15.1 7.7 2.1 49.5
   
Comparison  with Schneider (2004) Estimates* 
Author’s Estimates 62 14.7 6.6 2.1 34.9
Schneider’s estimates 62 34.8 10.4 13.4 53.5
*To be comparable, our estimates are restricted to the period 2000-2003, and the countries 
selected are those which are included in both studies. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Underground Economy (2000-05) 
 
Countries 
Underground 
Economy 
  
Countries 
Underground 
Economy 
Albania 21.3  Lithuania 11.3
Algeria 27.9  Madagascar 40.2
Argentina 8.1  Malaysia 10.5
Armenia 20.8  Malta 12.1
Bahamas, The 8.9  Mexico 9.5
Bahrain 3.8  Moldova 9.1
Bangladesh 16.4  Mongolia 13.9
Belarus 15.9  Morocco 12.3
Bolivia 13.9  Namibia 14.4
Bulgaria 13.2  Nicaragua 14.5
Burkina Faso 16.3  Oman 4.9
Cameroon 19.9  Papua New Guinea 21.0
Chile 8.7  Paraguay 20.9
China 6.2  Peru 13.1
Colombia 21.8  Philippines 9.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 61.2  Poland 10.7
Congo, Rep. 28.9  Romania 18.2
Costa Rica 10.0  Russian Federation 19.1
Cote d'Ivoire 32.9  Senegal 22.5
Croatia 12.6  Sierra Leone 27.9
Cyprus 11.5  Singapore 6.6
Czech Republic 8.0  Slovak Republic 12.6
Dominican Republic 23.2  Slovenia 10.9
Egypt, Arab Rep. 10.7  South Africa 23.8
El Salvador 13.3  Sri Lanka 13.9
Estonia 12.8  Syrian Arab Republic 11.5
Ethiopia 8.8  Thailand 12.3
Ghana 20.9  Togo 30.4
Guatemala 16.9  Trinidad and Tobago 13.5
Hungary 11.5  Tunisia 11.8
Indonesia 15.0  Turkey 15.6
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.2  Uganda 9.2
Israel 14.7  Ukraine 14.2
Jamaica 17.5  Uruguay 16.9
Jordan 13.3  Venezuela, RB 22.5
Kenya 20.0  Vietnam 10.5
Kuwait 2.4  Yemen, Rep. 26.9
Latvia 8.2  Zambia 16.5
Lebanon 10.6    
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Figure 1. Plot of Schneider’s and Author’s Estimates of Underground Economy, 2000- 
                 2003 
 
 
Figure 2. Plot of Schneider (2004) and Author’s Estimates of Underground Economy 
Some Outliers Removed, 2000-2003 
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